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I.
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
All parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. Appellant Carol Capato
was the plaintiff below. Appellees Garff Enterprises, Inc., Ken Garff, Tina Holbrook
and Does 1 through 10 were the defendants.
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rv.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j).
V.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that the "as is"
documents allegedly signed by the plaintiff completely preclude all of the plaintiffs
causes of action. (Minute entry, R. 134-6; A. 1-3) (See documents at issue included in
the addendum at 35-37; R. 99-101)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the
appellate court is free to re-appraise the trial court's legal conclusion without any
deference to those conclusions. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
"The standard of review, of course, for a summary judgment is one of correctness, with
no deference afforded to the trial court." Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 896-7
(Utah 1996).
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VI.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
The plaintiff purchased a used 1986 Mercedes from the defendant, Garff

Enterprises, in early June, 1996. In July, 1996, while the plaintiff was driving on 1-80,
the airbag suddenly, unexpectedly and without reason deployed causing the plaintiff to
lose control of the car. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries and property damage,
including damage to the car, in the accident. (Complaint and jury demand, R. 1-8)
The defendants maintain that the car was sold "as is" and without any sort of
warranty. The defendants have produced copies of documents which purportedly support
that position. (Memorandum in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment,
R. 91-104) The plaintiff maintains that she did not sign those documents. Additionally,
the plaintiff maintains, inter alia, that she relied upon statements made in the defendants'
advertising and by the defendant Tina Holbrook during the sales negotiations which
induced her to purchase the car.
After the plaintiff and the defendant Tina Holbrook were deposed, the defendants
moved the court for summary judgment maintaining that when the plaintiff purchased the
car and allegedly signed an "as is - no warranty" form, prepared by the defendants, that
the plaintiff waived all rights she could possibly have against the defendants for the
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damages related to the improper deployment of the airbag. (Plaintiffs memorandum in
opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment does not appear to be in the
record. It was filed on January 27, 1998 and is included in the addendum at 4-34. That
memorandum is incorporated into the plaintiffs reply memorandum in support of motion
to compel. R.122)
The plaintiff moved the court for an order to stay its ruling on the defendant's
motion for summary judgment and to compel discovery regarding defendant's advertising
efforts. (R. 105-17) Oral argument was heard by the court on March 2, 1998. On
March 16, 1998, the court entered it's minute entry granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. (R. 134-6; A. 1-3)
B.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review.
On June 1, 1996, the plaintiff purchased from the defendants a used 1986

Mercedes. The defendants maintain that the Mercedes had 126,850 miles on it at the
time of the purchase. (R.91) The plaintiff took possession of the car on or about June 8,
1996. (A. 19) When the plaintiff took possession of the car it had 127,195 miles on it.
Apparently the defendant's service personnel drove the car 345 miles while the defendants
retained possession of the car in order to tint it's windows as shown by the defendants'
service report. At the time of the accident, the Mercedes had 129,263 miles on it.
Although the plaintiff did not check the odometer at the time of the purchase, she denies

3

that she drove it 2,413 miles in the three weeks she had possession of the automobile
before the accident. (A.20-22)
Prior to agreeing to purchase the Mercedes, the plaintiff relied heavily upon the
defendants' advertising schemes and promises made by the defendant Holbrook during
the sales negotiations. (A.29-30) It is well known that the defendants advertised that
they "back up every used car" they sell. They also represented in their advertising
scheme that they had a "money back guarantee on all used cars". (A.27) Additionally,
the plaintiff was specifically told by the defendant Holbrook at the time of the purchase
that the defendants had "a checklist that they say they go down on every used car to make
sure these cars are safe", and that "they had gone over this checklist". (A.27) The
defendant Holbrook specifically stated "that the car was in perfect running order that
[Garff] . . . had always maintained this car, it had always gotten all of it's checkups, it
had always gotten maintained perfectly . . . and that it was already gone over by them
before it was even put out on the lot. . . that it had already gone through their vigorous
safety checks. (A.29-30)
The "as is-no warranty" form was not displayed in the window of the Mercedes
purchased by the plaintiff. The other used cars in the defendants' lot had such a form
displayed. (A.28) The plaintiff denies having seen the "as is-no warranty" documents
until they were presented to her at her deposition. (A.23-25)
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The airbag deployed improperly due to the failure of the driveline flex disc, which
was an original part on the 1986 Mercedes and was to have been replaced every three
years or 30,000 miles. (A.iv, 34) Because the court did not require the defendants to
fully answer the plaintiffs written discovery requests, the plaintiff was unable to discover
whether the driveline flex disc should have been checked or replaced as part of the
defendants' checklist allegedly followed prior to the sale of any used car.
VII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In ruling in favor of the defendants on their motion for summary judgment, the
court stated that the defendants have "provided credible evidence that the plaintiff signed
the "as is-no warranty" forms. The court apparently ignored the fact that the plaintiff
specifically testified that she had not seen those disclaimers prior to her deposition. The
plaintiff testified that she did not sign those documents. An issue of fact exists. This
matter must be reversed and remanded to the trial court.
The trial court also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because
it felt that the plaintiff failed to "clearly specify any specific oral representations or
advertising, or marketing, which induced her to buy the car." That conclusion is very
surprising in that the court requested to review the plaintiffs entire deposition. The
plaintiff in her deposition provided numerous specific reasons why she purchased the
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Mercedes from the defendants and stated that she relied upon the defendants' advertising
and other representations made during the sales negotiations in deciding to purchase the
car. Again, fact issues exist requiring the matter be remanded.
The "as is-no warranty" forms can only negate the existence of implied warranties.
The express warranties made by the defendants in the advertising scheme and to the
plaintiff directly survive. Finally, those forms are not effective to preclude the plaintiff
from recovery for her personal injuries.

vin.
ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is precluded, in the first instance, by the dispute concerning
the circumstances of the purchase. Genuine issues of material fact exist as to the alleged
signing of the forms and the defendants' promises. Moreover, even if the defendants'
version is accepted as true, the motion still fails as a matter of law. A disclaimer can only
be effective as to implied warranties. The defendants made express warranties. The
disclaimer is not effective as to plaintiffs recovery for personal injuries under any theory.
A,
The Dispute As To The Circumstances Of The Purchase
Transaction Precludes Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is not appropriate where there exists a dispute as to facts,
which are material to the transaction in question. See Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor
6

Co., 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975) ; TSI Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah App.
1994). Such is the case here.
The plaintiff denies seeing or signing the relevant documents at the time she
purchased the car. She has stated, that the "as-is" document was not displayed in the
car's window. Even if the evidence shows that plaintiff signed these documents, there
is a dispute as to whether she did so knowingly and after the terms of the sale were called
to her attention. See Thomas v. Ruddle Lease-Sales, Inc., 716 P.2d 911, 915 (Wash.
App. 1986). (A disclaimer is not effective unless it was negotiated and explained to the
used car buyer.)
Moreover, the meaning of at least one of the documents proffered by the
defendants is far from clear. See Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). (A
dispute as to meaning or interpretation of facts precludes summary judgment.) The
"Nothing owed/Nothing promised" document appears to be a work order form for service
to be performed without charge. That is, it reflects items which the dealer acknowledges
need to be corrected. "Nothing owed/nothing promised" seems to reflect that no items
need to be repaired. Such has nothing to do with disclaiming any warranty. Indeed, this
document can be more properly construed as a representation by the defendants that the
car was not in need of any type of service. That construction is consistent with the
defendant Holbrook's promise that the car was in "perfect running order."
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Finally, the plaintiff has testified as to specific representations by the defendants,
which could constitute express warranties, including: that the car had been inspected. See
e.g. Touchet Valley Grain v. Opp & Seibold Construction, 831 P.2d 724, 731 (Wash.
1992) (A statement that fabricating was "carefully checked" was an express warranty);
and, that defendants "backed" their used cars, see e.g. Welchman v. Wood, 353 P.2d 165,
167 (Utah 1960) ("person may warrant the occurrence of future events . . . such a
warranty is in effect a promise to respond in damages"). Whether or not such a
statement is a warranty or merely an opinion is a question of fact for the jury. See
Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Assoc, v. Graystone Pines, Inc.,
652 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1982); Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 241 P.2d 914, 918 (Utah
1952). As discussed below, neither express warranties nor tort liability are within the
scope of the alleged disclaimer here.
B.
At Most, The Alleged Disclaimer Negates the Existence Of Only Implied
Warranties
Section 70A-2-316(3)(a), U.C.A., upon which defendants rely, provides, that "all
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is.'" It says nothing about such
language excluding express warranties, much less strict liability, negligence or fraud.
Indeed, it is well-accepted that such causes of action (all of which plaintiff pleads here)
survive such disclaimers.
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1.

Express Warranty
Count II in the plaintiffs complaint pleads a claim for breach of express warranty,

as well as implied warranty. It is well-settled that statements or representations in
advertising (as is alleged here) can constitute express warranties. See Touchet Valley
Grain, 831 P.2d at 731; Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 657 P.2d 109, 112 (N.M.
1983); State by Div. of Cons. Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 314-15 (Utah 1988);
Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71 (Idaho 1983). It is equally wellsettled that a disclaimer "is inoperative when [it] is inconsistent with the language creating
the express warranty." Jensen, 668 P.2d at 71. See also Deaton, Inc., 657 P.2d at 112;
State v. GAF, 760 P.2d at 314-15. This applies to oral, as well as written, express
warranties. See Miller v. Hubbard-Wray Co., 630 P.2d 880 (Or. App. 1981). Indeed,
the statute, §70A-2-316(l), expressly provides that a disclaimer is "inoperative to the
extent that [a] construction [reconciling it with an express warranty] is unreasonable."
Thus, even if the disclaimer is effective as to implied warranties, plaintiff may still
proceed on her express warranty claim. The motion for summary judgment must be
denied.
2.

Tort Claims
Counts I, III and IV in the plaintiffs complaint plead claims, respectively, for

strict liability, negligence and fraud. The defendants maintain that their disclaimers
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preclude all of those claims; however, such disclaimers "have no effect on plaintiffs
recovery under common-law strict liability."

Washington Water Power v. Graybar

Electric, 114 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Wash. 1989). See also Waggoner v. Town & Country
Mobile Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649, 652 (Okl. 1990); Elite Professionals, Inc. v. Carrier
Corp., 827 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Ky. App. 1992). Excluding implied warranties does not
preclude a negligence claim. See Elite Prof., 827 P.2d at 1202-3; Waggoner, 808 P.2d
at 652. See also Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983) ("cause of action
in warranty is separate from a cause of action in negligence"). "[A] contract clause
limiting liability will not be applied in a fraud action." Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602,
608 (Utah 1974). Indeed, fraud in connection with the disclaimer would permit recovery
on an implied warranty. See Lamb, 525 P.2d at 608.
C.
The Disclaimer Is Ineffective As To A Personal Injury Claim
Under Any Theory
All of the cases cited by the defendants below involved economic loss—that is, the
damages were for loss of the value of the goods sold. Other damages, particularly for
personal injuries, are different, and the defendants' cases do not apply.
In contrast to economic loss, "the parties to a sales contact may not limit a
manufacturer's liability for personal injury caused by a product defect." Waggoner, 808
P.2d at 652. This applies to warranty claims, both express and implied, as well as tort
10

claims. See e.g. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991) ("implied warranties
are designed to protect ordinary consumers who do not have the knowledge, capacity or
opportunity to insure that goods which they are buying are in safe condition"); Elite
Prof., 827 P.2d at 1197 (every damage to property other than goods purchased is
different where disclaimer is concerned). In this regard, §2-719(3) of the U.C.C. (70A2-719(e), U.C.A.), provides:
Consequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is
unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable
(emphasis added)1
The plaintiff suffered personal injuries as the result of a defect in goods purchased
in a consumer transaction. The defendants cannot exclude their liability for such injuries.
At a minimum, because this is a consumer transaction, the presumption of
unconscionability under §70A-2-719(3) creates a factual dispute and precludes summary
judgment.

*It is also noteworthy that, as of April 29, 1996-just before the sale and accident-it
became a class B misdemeanor to knowingly fail to repair/rearm an airbag system. See
§41-6-145, U.C.A. This duty applies to vehicle owners, dealers and maintenance
facilities, and underscores the fundamental importance of the reliability of this safety
equipment.
11

IX.
CONCLUSION
Only a very narrow portion of plaintiffs case is susceptible at all to summary
judgment based upon the alleged disclaimer-recovery for the value of the car, itself,
under an implied warranty theory. Even as to that claim, the dispute as to what occurred
when the car was purchased precludes summary judgment. As a matter of law, the
disclaimer is ineffective as to most of plaintiffs' claims-all damages, including the car,
under strict liability, negligence or fraud, and, personal injury damages under all theories.
Accordingly, the trial court incorrectly granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.

This matter should be reversed and remanded for further

proceedings.
DATED this

day of September, 1998.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

By:
MARK DALTON DUNN
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Third Judicial District

MAR 1 6 1998
W

Deputy Oerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

CAROL CAPATO,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 970901748

Plaintiff,
vs.
GARFP ENTERPRISES, INC., KEN
6ARPF, TENA HOLBROOK and
DOES 1 through 10 inclusive,
Defendants•

Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment comes before the Court
pursuant to Rule 4-501.

Oral argument was had on March 2, 1998,

and thereafter the entire deposition of plaintiff was submitted to
the Court for review in support of the Motion.
Defendant has provided credible evidence that the plaintiff
signed a Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, which specifically says
that the buyer has seen a copy of the FTC Used Car Buyers Guide.
This paragraph was specifically signed by the plaintiff. Defendant
also submits an "As Is-No Warranty" document, also signed by the
plaintiff, and an additional document entitled "We Owe You" on
which is written "Nothing owed/Nothing promised", which is also
signed by the plaintiff.

Defendant's argument is that plaintiff

purchased a car with no warranties, and therefore has no claims

1

CAPATO V. GARFF

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

against the defendant for the accidental discharge of the airbag
while the vehicle was operating and any injuries attendant thereto•
Plaintiff responds with a Motion to Compel Discovery and
Motion to Stay, and the argument that defendant's disclaimers don't
apply to the causes of action alleged in the Complaint, including
strict liability, express and implied warranty, negligence and
fraud. Plaintiff relies upon the advertising and marketing done by
defendants to the effect that "We stand behind every car we sell",
"Any purchaser of a used car is entitled to their money back under
certain conditions", and some possible oral representation that
this car was thoroughly checked out before the sale, and such an
inspection would have revealed the defect which resulted in the
airbag deployments

The plaintiff fails in her deposition, or

otherwise, to clearly specify any specific oral representations or
advertising, or

marketing, which induced her to buy the car.

In

the absence of anything specific to that effect, and with the
clear, written waiver

signed by the plaintiff, defendant is

entitled to Summary Judgment.

2

CAPATO V. GARFF

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

Counsel for defendant shall prepare an Order consistent with
this ruling.
Dated this

.day of March, 1998.

STEPHEN L.: HENRIOD 4
DISTRICT. COURT JUDGE/

MARK DALTON DUNN - 4562
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
3575 South Market Street, #206
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801) 966-8111
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAROL CAPATO,

MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC., KEN
GARFF, TINA HOLBROOK and DOES 1
through 10 inclusive,

Civil No. 970901748
Judge Stephen L. Henroid

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Carol Capato, filed a four-count complaint to recover for personal injuries
and property damage, which she suffered when the airbag of a car purchased from defendants
deployed improperly. The theories alleged are as follows: count I, strict liability; count II,
express and implied warranty; count IQ, negligence; and, count IV, fraud. The defendants have
moved for summary judgment as to all counts solely on the ground of an alleged warranty
disclaimer. The defendants' motion must be denied. As a matter of law, such a disclaimer is

i
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effective~if at all—only as to an implied warranty claim. Indeed, it should be entirely ineffective
as any claim to recover for personal injuries, regardless of the theory.
The plaintiff has filed a motion requiring the defendants to produce discovery regarding
their advertising scheme and a motion to stay the court's ruling on the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The positions of the parties are directly in opposition on the issue of
whether the defendants' advertising scheme and other verbal representations created implied and
express warranties upon which the plaintiff may reasonably rely when purchasing a car.
Direction from the court is critical as to how this case will proceed with regard to discovery and
ultimately to trial.

n.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary and Overview
The plaintiff purchased a used 1986 Mercedes from the defendant, Garff Enterprises, in

early June, 1996. In July, 1996, while plaintiff was driving on 1-80, the airbag suddenly
deployed causing plaintiff to lose control of the car. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries and
property damage (including damage to the car) in the accident.
The defendants maintain that the car was sold "as is" and without any sort of warranty.
They have produced copies of documents which purportedly support that position. The plaintiff
maintains, among other things, that she relied upon statements made in the defendants'
advertising in purchasing the car.

ii
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B.

Disputed Material Facts
The plaintiff disputes the following facts, which the defendants assert are undisputed.
1.

The plaintiff disputes the assertions in paragraph 1 of the defendants' statement

of rundisputed material facts \ that she obtained the car on June 1, 1996 and that its odometer
showed 126,850 at the time. The plaintiff took possession of the car about one week after the
purchase date-ie. around June 8, 1996. (PI. Depo., p. 5)1 Although the plaintiff did not check
the odometer at the time of purchase, she denies that she drove it 2,413 miles in the three weeks
before the accident. (PL Depo., pp. 11-13) It is interesting to note that the car apparently had
127,195 miles on it before the plaintiff took possession of it. (See service report attached as
Exhibit B.) Either the documents are wrong or the defendants' service personnel drove the car
345 miles while the defendants retained possession of it to tint the windows.
2.

The plaintiff denies the implication of paragraph 3 of the defendants' statement,

that she was advised that the car was sold "as is" and without warranty. (PL Depo., p. 52) The
plaintiff denies seeing or reviewing the document designated at tabs 2 and 3 of the defendants'
motion, until her deposition. (PL Depo., pp. 18-20)
3.

The plaintiff also denies seeing or reviewing the document referred to in

paragraph 4 of the defendants' statement (at tab 4), until her deposition. (PL Depo., pp. 19-20)
4.

The plaintiff denies signing the documents referred to in paragraph 5 of the

defendants' statement. (PL Depo., pp. 18-20)

E x c e r p t s from p l a i n t i f f ' s
a r e a t t a c h e d as E x h i b i t A.

deposition,

c i t e d as

"Pi.

Depo."

iii
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5.

The plaintiff objects to paragraph 6 of the defendants' statement to the extent that

it discusses inferences and does not state facts.2
C.

Additional Material Facts
1.

The airbag deployed improperly due to the failure of the driveline flex disc, which

was an original part and was to have been replaced every 3 years or 30,000 miles. (Def. Ans.
to Interrog. Also see the vehicle repair estimate attached as Exhibit C.)
2.

A form indicating "as is-no warranty" was not displayed in the window of the car

purchased by the plaintiff, although such a form was displayed on other cars. (PL Depo., p. 64)
3.

The plaintiff purchased the car in response to an advertising campaign, in which

defendants' stated, "we back up every used car we sell" and, represented that they had a "money
back guaranty on all used cars". (PL Depo., p. 62)
4.

The plaintiff was told, at the time of purchase, that the defendants had "a checklist

that they say they go down on every used car to make sure these cars are safe" and, that "they
had gone over this checklist". (PL Depo., p. 62)
5.

The plaintiff was also told:
that the car was in perfect running order, that
[Garff] . . . had always maintained [the] car, it had
always gotten all of its checkups . . . and that it
was already gone over by them before it was even
put out on the lot . . .

2

The defendants cite no authority supporting the inference to
which they claim to be entitled; however, this is only marginally
important, at this point, because the defendants' motion fails as
a matter of law on other grounds.
iv
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that it had already gone through their vigorous
safety checks.
(PI. Depo., pp. 71-72.)
6.

The plaintiff relied upon the above, and other, representations in purchasing the

car. (PL Depo., pp., 71-72)

v
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in.
ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is precluded, in the first instance, by the dispute concerning the
circumstances of the purchase. Moreover, even if the defendants' version is accepted as true,
(which it should not be, as they are the moving party) the motion still fails as a matter of law.
A disclaimer can only be effective as to implied warranties. The disclaimer is not effective as
to recovery for personal injuries under any theory.
A.
The Dispute As To The Circumstances Of The Purchase
Transaction Precludes Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is not appropriate where there exists a dispute as to facts, which are
material to the transaction in question. See Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d
1039 (Utah 1975); TSI Partnership v. Alfred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1994). Such is the case
here.
The plaintiff denies seeing or signing the relevant documents, at the time she purchased
the car. She has stated, that the "as-is" document was not displayed in the car's window. Even
if the evidence shows that plaintiff signed these documents, there is a dispute as to whether she
did so knowingly and after the terms of the sale were called to her attention. See Thomas v.
Ruddle Lease-Sales, Inc., 716 P.2d 911, 915 (Wash. App. 1986). (A disclaimer is not effective
unless it was negotiated and explained to used car buyer.)

9

Moreover, the meaning of at least one of the documents proffered by the defendants is
far from clear. See Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). (A dispute as to meaning
or interpretation of facts precludes summary judgment.) The document at tab 4 appears to be
a work order form for service to be performed without charge. That is, it reflects items which
the dealer acknowledges need to be corrected. "Nothing owed/nothing promised" seems to
reflect that no items need to be repaired. Such has nothing to do with disclaiming any warranty.
Indeed, this document can be more properly construed as a representation by the defendants that
the car was not in need of any type of service.
Finally, the plaintiff has testified as to specific representations by the defendants, which
could constitute express warranties, including: that the car had been inspected. See e.g. Touchet
Valley Grain v. Opp & Seibold Construction, 831 P.2d 724, 731 (Wash. 1992) (A statement that
fabricating was "carefully checked" was an express warranty); and, that defendants "backed"
their used cars, see e j ^ Welchman v. Wood, 353 P.2d 165, 167 (Utah 1960) ("person may
warrant the occurrence of future events . . . such a warranty is in effect a promise to respond
in damages"). Whether or not such a statement is a warranty or merely an opinion is a question
of fact for the jury.

See Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Assoc, v.

Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1982); Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 241 P.2d
914, 918 (Utah 1952). As discussed below, neither express warranties nor tort liability are
within the scope of the alleged disclaimer here.

2
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B.
At Most, The Alleged Disclaimer Negates the Existence Of Only Implied
Warranties
Section 70A-2-316(3)(a), U.C. A., upon which defendants rely, provides, that "all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is.'" (emphasis added). It says nothing about
such language excluding express warranties, much less strict liability, negligence or fraud.
Indeed, it is well-accepted that such causes of action (all of which plaintiff pleads here) survive
such disclaimers.
1.

Express Warranty
Count II pleads a claim for breach of express warranty, as well as implied warranty. It

is well-settled that statements or representations in advertising (as is alleged here) can constitute
express warranties. See Touchet Valley Grain, 831 P.2d at 731; Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide
Corp., 657 P.2d 109, 112 (N.M. 1983); State by Div. of Cons. Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d
310, 314-15 (Utah 1988); Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71 (Idaho 1983).
It is equally well-settled that a disclaimer "is inoperative when [it] is inconsistent with the
language creating the express warranty." Jensen, 668 P.2d at 71. See also Deaton, Inc., 657
P.2d at 112; State v. GAF, 760 P.2d at 314-15. This applies to oral, as well as written, express
warranties. See Miller v. Hubbard-Wray Co., 630 P.2d 880 (Or. App. 1981). Indeed, the
statute, §70A-2-316(l), expressly provides that a disclaimer is "inoperative to the extent that [a]
construction [reconciling it with an express warranty] is unreasonable."

3
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Thus, even if the disclaimer is effective as to implied warranties, plaintiff may still
proceed on her express warranty claim. The motion for summary judgment must be denied.
2.

Tort Claims
Counts I, III and IV plead claims, respectively, for strict liability, negligence and fraud.

The sale argument made by the defendants is, that these claims are excluded by their alleged
disclaimer. This is incorrect, and summary judgment as to these counts must be denied.
Such disclaimers "have no effect on plaintiffs recovery under common-law strict
liability." Washington Water Power v. Graybar Electric, 714 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Wash. 1989).
See also Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649, 652 (Okl. 1990);
Elite Professionals, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Ky. App. 1992). Excluding
implied warranties does not preclude a negligence claim. See Elite Prof, 827 P.2d at 1202-3;
Waggoner, 808 P.2d at 652. See also Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983)
("cause of action in warranty is separate from a cause of action in negligence"). "[A] contract
clause limiting liability will not be applied in a fraud action." Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602,
608 (Utah 1974).3
3.

The Cases Cited By The Defendants Are Not To The Contrary
All of the cases cited by the defendants involved breach of warranty claims. Those cases

have no application to the plaintiffs tort claims, and the defendants cite no authority for granting
summary judgment as to these counts. Indeed, even the defendants tacitly acknowledge, that

3

Indeed, fraud in connection with the disclaimer would permit
recovery on an implied warranty. See Lamb, 525 P.2d at 608.

4
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those authorities apply only to implied warranty claims by referring to "implied warranties" in
describing the cases. To the extent that two of those cases might be construed as applying to
express warranty claims, such a view is in conflict with the plain language of §70A-2-316(l).
See Schneider v. Miller, 597 N.E. 2d 175 (Ohio App. 1991); Nick Miklacki Const. Co. v.
M.J.L. Truck Sales, Inc., 515 N.E. 2d 24 (Ohio App. 1986).
Defendants cite only one case from Utah, Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford, 681
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1984), which also involved only warranty (not tort) claims. The holding there
was not based upon the warranty disclaimer but, rather, upon plaintiffs, failure to prove the
terms of any warranty by written evidence or oral testimony. 681 P.2d at 1278. The disclaimer
discussion was a secondary rational in response to a dissent. Id. This has little to do with the
present case.
C.
The Disclaimer Is Ineffective As To A Personal Injury Claim
Under Any Theory
All of the cases cited by the defendants involved economic loss-that is, the damages were
for loss of the value of the goods sold. Other damages, particularly for personal injuries, are
different, and the defendants' cases do not apply.
In contrast to economic loss, "the parties to a sales contact may not limit a
manufacturer's liability for personal injury caused by a product defect." Waggoner, 808 P.2d
at 652. This applies to warranty claims, both express and implied, as well as tort claims. See
e.g. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991) ("implied warranties are designed to
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protect ordinary consumers who do not have the knowledge, capacity or opportunity to insure
that goods which they are buying are in safe condition"); Elite Prof., 827 P.2d at 1197 (every
damage to property other than goods purchased is different where disclaimer is concerned). In
this regard, §2-719(3) of the U.C.C. (70A-2-719(e), U.C.A.), provides:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded
unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima
facie unconscionable . . . .
(emphasis added)4
The plaintiff suffered personal injuries as the result of a defect in goods purchased in a
consumer transaction. The defendants cannot exclude their liability for such injuries. At a
minimum, because this is a consumer transaction, the presumption of unconscionability under
§70A-2-719(3) creates a factual dispute and precludes summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Only a very narrow portion of plaintiff s case is susceptible at all to summary judgment
based upon the alleged disclaimer-recovery for the value of the car, itself, under an implied
warranty theory. Even as to that claim, the dispute as to what occurred when the car was
purchased precludes summary judgment. As a matter of law, the disclaimer is ineffective as to

4

It is also noteworthy that, as of April 29, 1996--just before
the sale and accident--it became a class B misdemeanor to knowingly
fail to repair/rearm an airbag system. See §41-6-145, U.C.A. This
duty applies to vehicle owners, dealers and maintenance facilities,
and underscores the fundamental importance of the reliability of
this safety equipment.
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most of plaintiffs' claims—all damages, including the car, under strict liability, negligence or
fraud, and, personal injury damages under all theories.
Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment must be denied.
DATED this 27th day of January, 1998.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

MARK DALTON DUNN
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CERTD7ICATE OF MADLING
I certify that on die

fflfa' day of Qfl/VUifl^ 1998 I mailed a true and correct

copy of MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT {Capato v Garff Enterprises, Inc., et. al.) by depositing the same,
postage prepaid, U.S. Mail to all counsel of record.
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10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CAROL CAPATO,
Plaintiff,
V.
Civil No. 970901748
GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC,, KEN
GARFF, TENA HOLBROOK and
DOES I through 10 inclusive.

Judge S. L. Henroid

Defendant.
DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
OF
CAROL CAPATO
Taken Pursuant to Notice and the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure
Wednesday, June 18, 1997, 8:10 a.m.
At the law offices of:
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, 9th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
By:

Peggy Grover, RMR, Notary Public, License #7801

Associated Professional Reporters
10 West Broadway, Suite 200 Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801X322-3441 / FAX (801) 322-3443
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Q.

Did you drive the Mercedes away from the

Garff place of business on that day?
A.

I can't exactly remember because they had to

do tinting on the windows and buffing the paint and it
took a week.
Q.

I see.

A.

So I am not sure. I think that was

afterwards.

They did that as soon as I did all this

paperwork, then it went into the shop to have that done.
Q.

And then you came back and got the Mercedes?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did whatever you wanted with the

Mercedes?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now on Deposition Exhibit 1, again, there is

a place on the form for odometer reading at the time you
signed Deposition Exhibit 1.

It says 126,853 miles, do

you see that?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Does that comport with your memory of the

mileage of the vehicle at the time you purchased the
car?
A.

As I remember. As I recall.

Q.

On the 3rd of July 3rd of 1996, you were

eastbound on 1-80 going to Wyoming?

19
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about it*
Q.

Let me hand you a copy of what has been

marked as your Deposition Exhibit 5. It is the odometer
statement* Is that your signature on that one?
A*

Yes, it is.

Q.

The 1st of June of 1996?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So you were aware that one also said the

odometer reading at time you purchased that car was
126,853 miles.
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you look at that one before you signed

A.

When I signed it we were in the office, we

it?

were not by the car for me to look at the odometer, to
match it up and see if it was correct.
Q.

I understand that. That's not my question.

Did you look at the form to see that you were being
informed what the odometer reading was by this statement
before you signed it?
A.

Yes•

Q.

Do you have any explanation how you put 2,413

miles on the car between the 1st of June and the 3rd of
July 1996?
A.

No.

20
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1

Q.

Just driving around town?

2

A.

Well, like I said, I didn't have it for a

3

week* I never really looked at the mileage* I didn't

4

even drive it that much, so there is no way I could have

5

put that many miles on it. I didn't get to drive it* I

6

have a business and I drive the business truck so it sat

7

quite a bit.

8
9

1

Q.

Did anybody else drive the 1986 Mercedes in

that 32 days other than you?

10

A.

No.

Not that I know of. Like I said, it was

11

with them a week,

12

didn't.

13
14

Q.

I don't know what they did but I

No one that I knew drove the car.
What other licensed motor vehicle operators

were there in your family at that time?

15

A.

None.

16

Q.

A husband?

17

A.

No, I don't have a husband.

18

Q.

You were the head of your household at that

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

Had these two kids that you already told me

23

A-

Yes.

24

Q.

Who were not licensed?

25

A.

No, they are too young.

19
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time?

about?
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Q.

They are sixteen year old?

A*

She is sixteen now.

Q.

I see. Any other children in your home at

that point?
A.

No.

Q.

So nobody had access t o t h e motor v e h i c l e

during t h a t 30 days other than you?
A.

No.

Q.

So it is your testimony that you didn't put

2,413 miles on it in that 32 days?
A.

I know I couldn't have put that many on it

really. I mean if you say it was that many breaking down
per day because I didn't drive it anywhere else. That
was going to be the big long haul, to take it on a road
trip.

Actually, I was quite excited to be able to drive

it.
Q.

What road trip?

A.

To go up to Evans ton, that was going to be

the long jaunt for the car. I hadn't gotten to drive it
a whole lot.
Q.

When you first saw this 1986 Mercedes, where

was it?
A.

Down at the Ken Garff dealership up

underneath like an awning. There is a long awning and it
was up parked on it like that. Actually, it was the
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A.

Approximately a year ago.

Q.

And left that car here in Utah with you?

A.

Yes.

Q-

Where is that car now; still with you?

A.

Actually, I drove it here today.

Q.

Let me show you what has been marked to your

deposition as Exhibit 3.

Is that your signature down

at the bottom?

A.

It appears to be.

Q-

Do you know if what has been marked as

Deposition Exhibit 3 is the back side of Deposition
Exhibit No . 2?
A

*

Q.

This is on the back of that?
Yeah.

See where it says Buyer's Guide in

bold print all caps at the top of Deposition Exhibit 2?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q»

Do you see that?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Do you see on Deposition Exhibit No. 3 where

you can see it coming through the back side?

A.

Yes, I see that.

Q.

Buyer's Guide?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Is that your signature down at the bottom of

Deposition Exhibit 3?
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A.

Actually, it appears to be my signature. I

don't know because I never saw this.
Q.

You never saw what?

A.

This As Is—No Warranty, this particular

thing that goes in all the cars, I didn't ever see this,
so—
MR. GRAY:

You are referring to Exhibit 2?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I am sorry, Exhibit 2. I
can't explain it except I never got to see that Exhibit
2.
Q.

(Mr. Henderson) Is this the first time you

have ever seen Deposition Exhibit 2?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Let me show you what has been marked to your

deposition Exhibit No. 4.

Is that your signature down

at the bottom of Deposition Exhibit 4?
A.

It appears to be my signature.

Q.

This is a preprinted form in all caps We Owe

You statement.

Do you see the words in there, "Nothing

owed/Nothing Promised1'?
A.

I see that.

Q.

Were t h o s e words on there when you s i g n e d t h e

A.

How do I answer that?

form?
I d o n ' t remember

s i g n i n g t h i s form; i n f a c t , I have never s e e n t h i s form
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and I have no copy of that form as far as this Nothing
Owed/Nothing Promised, I am not even sure what that
means because I did owe money on it. I did end up
financing part of the car somewhere. Does that even
mean—?
Q.

Are you saying that's not your signature down

at the bottom of Deposition Exhibit No. 4?
A.

No, that appears to be my signature.

Q.

Then back to my question: Were those words

written in the form at the time you signed it?
A.

I don't believe so.

Q.

Who at Ken Garff did you have any

conversations with about the 1986 Mercedes?
A.

Tena Holbrook, the woman that talked me into

getting the windows tinted and the paint buffed, and
then whoever the man was that did the financing, and
then also a man named Ryan, a service manager.
Q.

Who was the first person at Ken Garff that

you had any dealings with on the Mercedes?
A.

Tena, Tena Holbrook.

Q.

You have already told me how she showed you

the car the first time you saw the car.
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you test drive it at that time?

A.

I can't remember if I did or not, I know I
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I just knew it was a good idea and I wanted to get one.
Yes, I knew it didn't come for free.

Of course, you are

going to have to pay more for it or something.
Q.

Any other discussions with Tena about a

warranty other than what you just told me about the
extended warranty?
A.

Not that I can recall because I was just

basically waiting for it, I thought it was just as much
as her going in amd checking with somebody to get it and
then come back and tell me, "Oh, yes. Okay.
it is.

Well, here

This is how much you have to pay," or something.

I was waiting for an answer.
Q.

Were you ever told by Tena or anybody at Ken

Garff that you were purchasing the 1986 Mercedes as is?
A.

No.

Q.

Had you ever purchased a motor vehicle as is

before the 3rd of July of 1996?
A.

I purchased a used car from another

dealership a long time ago but I can't remember if it
was as is or not, it was a Hyundai, Hyundai Sonata.
Q.

Here in Salt Lake?

A.

It was a little dealership right off of 90th

LSouth, they are not even there any more, I don't think.
Q.

Was this the first time in your life you

purchased a used car?
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A.

Yes, I did have an idea in my mind.

Q.

What did you think?

A.

Have you seen Ken Garff's commercial?

Q.

Yes, I have*

A.

Have you seen Ken Garff standing behind a car

saying, "We back up every used car we sell.H

Have you

also seen the one that says we have a no hassle 100
percent money back guaranty on all used cars we sell?
That's what I saw and that's why I went there because I
trusted them.
Q.

Ken Garff?

A*

The whole dealership, I trusted them, I

believed it when they said that.

They have also a

checklist that they say that they go down on every used
car to make sure these cars are safe and they told me
they had gone over this checklist.
Q,

Did you have any discussion with anybody

about the fact that the vehicle that you were interested
in; that is the 1986 Mercedes, was there as a
consignment vehicle?
A.

She had— I didn't know it was a consignment

vehicle.

She said it used to be her car and then she

had a nice new one that looked like a roller skate, I
didn't know what type it was, I didn't really think much
of it.

I thought she had traded it in for that little
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me to repeat it?
A.

Go ahead and repeat it,

Q.

As you saw the form that's Deposition Exhibit

2 in the other cars for sale on the Ken Garff lot?
A.

Uh-huh. Yes.

Q.

Did it cross your mind to make inquiry as to

where such a warning was in the 1986 Mercedes?
A.

I did inquire.

I asked her where it was and

she said, "Isn't it there?" And she went around and she
said, "Yes, you are right, it is not there."
it, I never did get to see one.

That was

It was not there on the

window and I do have witnesses that were there, too,
that saw that it was not there.
Q.

Who is that?

A.

Candace Keele, Jennifer Schiers, and then, of

course, my two little kids.
Q.

Who is Candace?

A.

Candace Keele is my little sister's best

friend, and Jennifer Schiers is my little sister.
Q.

They were there with you, were they?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Which day or all of them?

A.

I had gone back a couple of times to look at

the car and it usually was sitting, in fact, it was
always sitting right there in that spot and I can't
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A,

No.

Q.

You have an allegation in your complaint that

you were a victim of fraud and I am wondering what is it
that you claim that you were told t h a t —
A*

I was told—

Q.

Let me finish my question.

An element of

fraud is not only that you were told something that
proves to not be true but also the people that told it
to you knew it was not true at the time they told it to
you.

What was it about the acquisition of the 1986

Mercedes that you claim you were told was not true and
the people that told it to you knew it was not true when
they told it to you?
A.

I was told that the car was in perfect

running order, that Ken Garff, you know, the car lot,
had taken—

had always maintained this car, it had

always gotten all of its checkups, it had always gotten
maintained perfectly; in fact, it had always been in the
Ken Garff family, the people that owned it had also
worked for Ken Garff there and that it was already gone
over by them before it was even put out on the lot.
Q.

That's it?

A.

Well, yes, basically that it was in excellent

working order, that it was a safe, dependable car, and
that, like I said, that it had already gone through
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their vigorous safety checks,
Q.

How many days couldn't you work after the 3rd

of July?
A.

I couldn't tell you the exact amount. I have

got my partner getting all the information on the
computer for you guys. You know, I had quite a few days
sometimes I could work but I would only do a few jobs
and get a terrible headache or something, compared to
before when I would do ten jobs.
Q.

You actually go to residences or other places

of business and do the pest control yourself?
A.

Yes.

Q.

I see.

A.

It is not strenuous at all, it is, you know,

I mean it was a little strenuous but, yes, I can perform
that job.
Q.

Were you laid up for a couple of days that

you didn't work at all?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How long?

A.

I would say for about, I don't know, three to

four days.

Everything kind of started hurting a week or

so afterwards.

I mean I think I was in shock so I

didn't really know the extent of what was going on, but
I do remember one weekend that I fell asleep on Thursday
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--H

152?
CAPATO,CAROL S
1 7 8 7 EAST LINCOLN LANE
HOLLAOAY UT 8 4 1 2 4
HOME PHONE 8 0 1 3 6 3 - 6 1 5 2
BUS. PHONE 8 0 1 9 6 3 - 2 4 9 6
86 MERCEDES 19QE 1 2 3 2 6 6
Command? ( E n t e r , * , N , V E H ,

CUSTOMER
DELV. DATE
IN SERVICE
WAF .E,'P. DATE
LICENSE NO.
SLEMN
CUST,

DLR CODE
KG/OLDS
ENG NO.
1 4 0 . 3 C I D G<
TRAN NO.
A
AXLE NO.
COLOR
PROD DATE
USED
TYPE
GC013
STOCK NO.
24
DEL CODE
LAST SERV 01JUN96
Command"' ( E n t e r , * , N , VEH, CUST,
Command'5 ( E n t e r , * , N , VEH, CUST,

GC019
01-J UN 9 6
01JUN36
KEY N STKP GF£ . « i * ~ ' i i
1110

?) . . . . ?*

?)
?)

MILEAGE: 127195
OPENED: 06JUN36
CLOSED: 17JUN35
TECH. TYPE. OPCODE
CB-RO.. DESCRIPTION,
NO DESCRIPTION
IDU
D-116
NO DESCRIPTION
I PRO D-200
MISC. SHOP CHARGES
I PRO 9997
NO DESCRIPTION
IACC D-619
SUBLET REPAIRS
IACC 9399

RO NO : 60343
wn a • •

18
18
.18
18
18

121
121
939

Press return to continue, S to list the story for this RO, or E to e-.it:
RO NO: 186531
OPENED: 16MAY96
CLOSED: 16MAr?6
MILEAGE: 126457
SA... TECH. TYPE. OPCODE
CB-RO.. DESCRIPTION
131
9
CME
MA
FRONT END THRUST ANGLE ALIGNMENT
131
9
CME
DONE
OPERATION COMPLETED.
Press return to continue, S to list the story for this RO, or E to exlt : ?
CLOSED: 29MAR96
MILEAGE: 125245
RO N O : 654621
OPENED: 19MAR96
SA... TECH. TYPE. OPCODE.
NO DESCRIPTION
< 347
382
COI
24R
NO DESCRIPTION
347
382
COI
24S
MISC. SHOP CHARGES
347
COI
9997
11

J

EXHIBIT C
33

VEHICLE REPAIR ESTIMATE
Idaho Intermountain Claims
1947 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Insured:
Claimant:
Date of Accident:
Vehicle:
Mileage:

V\ w . »•

Garff Enterprises
Carol Capato
July 3,1996
1986 Mercedes 190E
129,266
MECH HRS

ITEM
Airbag 1294600398
Crash Sensor 0248201110
Seat Belt, L/F 2018603185
Driveline Flex Disc

1.0
1.5
1.5
1.4

Totals
Mech hours @ 58.00 5.4
Total,
Tax @ 6.25%
Total, Repair

VIN: WDBDA:
PARTS
$ 1,760.00
1,070.00
198.00
93 00
3,121.00
313.20
3,434.20
214.64
$ 3,648.84

Appraiser Keith Nagel
Repair Shop: Ken Garfif Mercedes-Benz Service
Per : Ken Jensen, Shop Manager
This is not an authorization to repair. Any repair authorr/ation must come from the owner of the
vehicle. No supplements without prior authorization from the insurance company.

BUYERS CVIDE
J O H T A N T ; Spoken promises ar^ difficult to enforce. Ask the dealer to put ail promises In writing. Keep
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WARRANTIES FOR T H I S VEHICLE:

AS IS-NO WARRANTY
YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer assumes no responsibility for any repai
regardless of any oral statements about the vehicle.

WARRANTY
• FULL •

STSTEMS

LIMITED WARRANTY. The dealer will pay
% of the labor and
% of the parts for tlcovered systems that fail during the warranty period. Ask the dealer for a copy of the warrar
document for a full explanation of warranty coverage, exclusions, and the dealer's rep.
obligations. Under state law, "implied warranties" may give you even more rights.
COYERED:

DURA T)0 ht

O SERVICE C O N T R A C T . A service contract is available at an extra charge on this vehicle. Ask fc
details as to coverage, deductible, price, and exclusions. If you buy a service contract within 90 days c
the time of sale, state law "implied warranties" may give you additional rights.
PRE-PURCHASE INSPECTION: ASK THE DEALER IF YOU MAY HAVE THIS VEHICLE INSPECTED B v
YOUR MECHANIC EITHER ON OR OFF THE LOT.
SEE THE BACK OF THIS FORM for important additional information, Including* a list of some major defect:
that may occur In used motor vehicles.
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Below is a list of some major defects that may„occurJn,used motor vehicles
Frame & Body
Frame-cracks, corrective welds, or rusted through
Dogtracks-bent-or twisted frame ••
'

~ .

Engine
Oil leakage, excluding normal seepage
Cracked block or head
Belts missing or inoperable
Knocks or misses related to camshaft lifters and oush rods
Aonormal exhaust discnarge
Transmission & Drive Shaft
Improper fluid level or leakage, excluding normal seepage
Cracked or damaged case which is visible
'Abn^rmarnctse ofyibration caHed by faulty tfansmisSion"
V d n v e s h a f t . j ^ ' i £rjf* ^*Zh 2^% J
Improper'shifting or functioning in'.any gear r
Manual clutch slips or charters

improper fluid level or leakage, excluding normal seepage
Crackec or damaged housing which :s visible
Abnormal noise or vibration caused by faulty differential

Steering System^ .. .. __^ mm w .^ ^ mwm
Too much free o.'ay at steering wheel (DOT specs
Free play 'm linKage more than 1M inch
Steering gear binds or jams
Front wheel aligned irnproperty^DOJjspecs.)
Power~uhit belts.cracked or "slipping
PojJer unit'fluidlevel fmprojjer i
. Suspension System
Bail joint seals damaged
Structural pans bent or damaged
• * Stabilizer bar disconnected' - - - - ^
• * Spring broken * ' l »-*r:.'Cr , v !£•:•:
Shock abscber mounting loose
Rubber busmngs damaged or missing
Radius rod damaged or missing
Shock abscroer leaking or functioning improperly

Tires

Cooling System
Leakage including radiator
Improperly functioning water pump

Tread depth less than 2/32 inch'
Sizes mismatched.
'r' Visible "damage

Electrical System
Battery leakage
Improperly functioning alternator,.generator, battery, or starter.

Fuel System
Visible ieaxage

• Brake System
. Failure warning light broken
••
• -Pedal not firm un<jer -pressure (OOT-specs.)"Not enough pedal reserve (DOT specs.)
Does not stop vehicle m snaight line (DOT specs
Hoses damaged
Drum or rotor too thin (Mfgr. specs.)
•• • •
Lining or pad thickness less than 1/32"incti
Power unit not operating or leaking
Structural or mechanical Darts damaged

Wheels
Visible cracks, damage or repairs •
Mounting bolls toose or missing.
Exhaust System Leakage

Inoperable Accessories
Gauges or warning devices
Air conditioner
~ Heater" & Defroster ~

06AL5R
A22HESS

SEE FOR COMPLAINTS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form is part of any contract to buy this vehicle. Removal of this la
before consumer purchase ( e x c e p t for purpose of test-driving) is a violation of federal lawT[16 C.F.R..455
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CUSTOMER SIGNATURE
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RECEIPT Or ORIGINAL COPY ACKNOWLEDGE::

•L-^t^e-^-gV

?

EXHIBIT NO..

> > Q P M 8 (801) 466.9009

GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC.
OL0SMO8ILS • HYUNOAi
SAAB • M6RC5D6S-3ENZ • VOLVO
JAGUAR • HONDA

WE OWE YOU

VOID
AFTER
THIS DATE

WORK PROMISED TO BE PERFORMED AT TIME OF SALE
osscaiprioN of;
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3.
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4.
5.
o.

NOTE: THE ABOVE PROMISED WORK IS THE J3NLY WORK TO BE PERFORMED FREE OF CHARGE. ANY
ADDITIONAL WORK WILL BE CHARGED FOR.

DUE TO INSURANCE/feGULATlONS - NO LOAN CARS AVAILABLE
Signed: Sales Mgr.

Signed: Customed J^.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

I&

day of September, 1998,1 mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT {Capato v. Garff Enterprises,
Inc.), postage prepaid, to:
Robert H. Henderson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5000
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